spiegel_podman/vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/pathrs-lite/open_purego.go
Nicola Sella df4905d68b
Remove hardcoded refs from ociartifact code
Fixes: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RUN-3578

Signed-off-by: Nicola Sella <nsella@redhat.com>
2025-11-13 22:57:21 +01:00

42 lines
1.6 KiB
Go

// SPDX-License-Identifier: MPL-2.0
//go:build linux && !libpathrs
// Copyright (C) 2024-2025 Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
// Copyright (C) 2024-2025 SUSE LLC
//
// This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
// License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
// file, You can obtain one at https://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
package pathrs
import (
"os"
"github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/pathrs-lite/internal/gopathrs"
"github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/pathrs-lite/internal/procfs"
)
// OpenatInRoot is equivalent to [OpenInRoot], except that the root is provided
// using an *[os.File] handle, to ensure that the correct root directory is used.
func OpenatInRoot(root *os.File, unsafePath string) (*os.File, error) {
return gopathrs.OpenatInRoot(root, unsafePath)
}
// Reopen takes an *[os.File] handle and re-opens it through /proc/self/fd.
// Reopen(file, flags) is effectively equivalent to
//
// fdPath := fmt.Sprintf("/proc/self/fd/%d", file.Fd())
// os.OpenFile(fdPath, flags|unix.O_CLOEXEC)
//
// But with some extra hardenings to ensure that we are not tricked by a
// maliciously-configured /proc mount. While this attack scenario is not
// common, in container runtimes it is possible for higher-level runtimes to be
// tricked into configuring an unsafe /proc that can be used to attack file
// operations. See [CVE-2019-19921] for more details.
//
// [CVE-2019-19921]: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fh74-hm69-rqjw
func Reopen(handle *os.File, flags int) (*os.File, error) {
return procfs.ReopenFd(handle, flags)
}