mirror of
https://github.com/podman-container-tools/podman.git
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SpecGen is our primary container creation abstraction, and is used to connect our CLI to the Libpod container creation backend. Because container creation has a million options (I exaggerate only slightly), the struct is composed of several other structs, many of which are quite large. The core problem is that SpecGen is also an API type - it's used in remote Podman. There, we have a client and a server, and we want to respect the server's containers.conf. But how do we tell what parts of SpecGen were set by the client explicitly, and what parts were not? If we're not using nullable values, an explicit empty string and a value never being set are identical - and we can't tell if it's safe to grab a default from the server's containers.conf. Fortunately, we only really need to do this for booleans. An empty string is sufficient to tell us that a string was unset (even if the user explicitly gave us an empty string for an option, filling in a default from the config file is acceptable). This makes things a lot simpler. My initial attempt at this changed everything, including strings, and it was far larger and more painful. Also, begin the first steps of removing all uses of containers.conf defaults from client-side. Two are gone entirely, the rest are marked as remove-when-possible. [NO NEW TESTS NEEDED] This is just a refactor. Signed-off-by: Matt Heon <mheon@redhat.com>
273 lines
9.2 KiB
Go
273 lines
9.2 KiB
Go
//go:build !remote
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package generate
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import (
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"fmt"
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"strings"
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"github.com/containers/common/libimage"
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"github.com/containers/common/pkg/apparmor"
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"github.com/containers/common/pkg/capabilities"
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"github.com/containers/common/pkg/config"
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"github.com/containers/podman/v4/libpod"
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"github.com/containers/podman/v4/libpod/define"
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"github.com/containers/podman/v4/pkg/specgen"
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"github.com/containers/podman/v4/pkg/util"
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"github.com/opencontainers/runtime-tools/generate"
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"github.com/opencontainers/selinux/go-selinux/label"
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"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
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"golang.org/x/exp/slices"
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)
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// setLabelOpts sets the label options of the SecurityConfig according to the
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// input.
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func setLabelOpts(s *specgen.SpecGenerator, runtime *libpod.Runtime, pidConfig specgen.Namespace, ipcConfig specgen.Namespace) error {
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if !runtime.EnableLabeling() || s.IsPrivileged() {
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s.SelinuxOpts = label.DisableSecOpt()
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return nil
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}
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var labelOpts []string
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if pidConfig.IsHost() {
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labelOpts = append(labelOpts, label.DisableSecOpt()...)
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} else if pidConfig.IsContainer() {
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ctr, err := runtime.LookupContainer(pidConfig.Value)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("container %q not found: %w", pidConfig.Value, err)
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}
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secopts, err := label.DupSecOpt(ctr.ProcessLabel())
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to duplicate label %q : %w", ctr.ProcessLabel(), err)
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}
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labelOpts = append(labelOpts, secopts...)
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}
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if ipcConfig.IsHost() {
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labelOpts = append(labelOpts, label.DisableSecOpt()...)
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} else if ipcConfig.IsContainer() {
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ctr, err := runtime.LookupContainer(ipcConfig.Value)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("container %q not found: %w", ipcConfig.Value, err)
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}
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secopts, err := label.DupSecOpt(ctr.ProcessLabel())
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to duplicate label %q : %w", ctr.ProcessLabel(), err)
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}
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labelOpts = append(labelOpts, secopts...)
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}
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s.SelinuxOpts = append(s.SelinuxOpts, labelOpts...)
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return nil
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}
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func setupApparmor(s *specgen.SpecGenerator, rtc *config.Config, g *generate.Generator) error {
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hasProfile := len(s.ApparmorProfile) > 0
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if !apparmor.IsEnabled() {
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if hasProfile && s.ApparmorProfile != "unconfined" {
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return fmt.Errorf("apparmor profile %q specified, but Apparmor is not enabled on this system", s.ApparmorProfile)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// If privileged and caller did not specify apparmor profiles return
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if s.IsPrivileged() && !hasProfile {
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return nil
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}
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if !hasProfile {
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s.ApparmorProfile = rtc.Containers.ApparmorProfile
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}
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if len(s.ApparmorProfile) > 0 {
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g.SetProcessApparmorProfile(s.ApparmorProfile)
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}
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return nil
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}
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func securityConfigureGenerator(s *specgen.SpecGenerator, g *generate.Generator, newImage *libimage.Image, rtc *config.Config) error {
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var (
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caplist []string
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err error
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)
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// HANDLE CAPABILITIES
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// NOTE: Must happen before SECCOMP
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if s.IsPrivileged() {
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g.SetupPrivileged(true)
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caplist, err = capabilities.BoundingSet()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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} else {
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mergedCaps, err := capabilities.MergeCapabilities(rtc.Containers.DefaultCapabilities.Get(), s.CapAdd, s.CapDrop)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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boundingSet, err := capabilities.BoundingSet()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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boundingCaps := make(map[string]interface{})
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for _, b := range boundingSet {
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boundingCaps[b] = b
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}
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for _, c := range mergedCaps {
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if _, ok := boundingCaps[c]; ok {
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caplist = append(caplist, c)
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}
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}
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privCapsRequired := []string{}
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// If the container image specifies a label with a
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// capabilities.ContainerImageLabel then split the comma separated list
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// of capabilities and record them. This list indicates the only
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// capabilities, required to run the container.
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var capsRequiredRequested []string
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for key, val := range s.Labels {
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if slices.Contains(capabilities.ContainerImageLabels, key) {
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capsRequiredRequested = strings.Split(val, ",")
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}
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}
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if !s.IsPrivileged() && len(capsRequiredRequested) == 1 && capsRequiredRequested[0] == "" {
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caplist = []string{}
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} else if !s.IsPrivileged() && len(capsRequiredRequested) > 0 {
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// Pass capRequiredRequested in CapAdd field to normalize capabilities names
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capsRequired, err := capabilities.MergeCapabilities(nil, capsRequiredRequested, nil)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("capabilities requested by user or image are not valid: %q: %w", strings.Join(capsRequired, ","), err)
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}
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// Verify all capRequired are in the capList
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for _, cap := range capsRequired {
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if !slices.Contains(caplist, cap) {
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privCapsRequired = append(privCapsRequired, cap)
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}
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}
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if len(privCapsRequired) == 0 {
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caplist = capsRequired
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} else {
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logrus.Errorf("Capabilities requested by user or image are not allowed by default: %q", strings.Join(privCapsRequired, ","))
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}
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}
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}
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configSpec := g.Config
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configSpec.Process.Capabilities.Ambient = []string{}
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// Always unset the inheritable capabilities similarly to what the Linux kernel does
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// They are used only when using capabilities with uid != 0.
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configSpec.Process.Capabilities.Inheritable = []string{}
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configSpec.Process.Capabilities.Bounding = caplist
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user := strings.Split(s.User, ":")[0]
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if (user == "" && s.UserNS.NSMode != specgen.KeepID) || user == "root" || user == "0" {
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configSpec.Process.Capabilities.Effective = caplist
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configSpec.Process.Capabilities.Permitted = caplist
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} else {
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mergedCaps, err := capabilities.MergeCapabilities(nil, s.CapAdd, nil)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("capabilities requested by user are not valid: %q: %w", strings.Join(s.CapAdd, ","), err)
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}
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boundingSet, err := capabilities.BoundingSet()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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boundingCaps := make(map[string]interface{})
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for _, b := range boundingSet {
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boundingCaps[b] = b
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}
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var userCaps []string
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for _, c := range mergedCaps {
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if _, ok := boundingCaps[c]; ok {
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userCaps = append(userCaps, c)
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}
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}
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configSpec.Process.Capabilities.Effective = userCaps
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configSpec.Process.Capabilities.Permitted = userCaps
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// Ambient capabilities were added to Linux 4.3. Set ambient
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// capabilities only when the kernel supports them.
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if supportAmbientCapabilities() {
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configSpec.Process.Capabilities.Ambient = userCaps
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configSpec.Process.Capabilities.Inheritable = userCaps
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}
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}
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if s.NoNewPrivileges != nil {
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g.SetProcessNoNewPrivileges(*s.NoNewPrivileges)
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}
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if err := setupApparmor(s, rtc, g); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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// HANDLE SECCOMP
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if s.SeccompProfilePath != "unconfined" {
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seccompConfig, err := getSeccompConfig(s, configSpec, newImage)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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configSpec.Linux.Seccomp = seccompConfig
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}
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// Clear default Seccomp profile from Generator for unconfined containers
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// and privileged containers which do not specify a seccomp profile.
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if s.SeccompProfilePath == "unconfined" || (s.IsPrivileged() && (s.SeccompProfilePath == "" || s.SeccompProfilePath == config.SeccompOverridePath || s.SeccompProfilePath == config.SeccompDefaultPath)) {
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configSpec.Linux.Seccomp = nil
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}
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if s.ReadOnlyFilesystem != nil {
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g.SetRootReadonly(*s.ReadOnlyFilesystem)
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}
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noUseIPC := s.IpcNS.NSMode == specgen.FromContainer || s.IpcNS.NSMode == specgen.FromPod || s.IpcNS.NSMode == specgen.Host
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noUseNet := s.NetNS.NSMode == specgen.FromContainer || s.NetNS.NSMode == specgen.FromPod || s.NetNS.NSMode == specgen.Host
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noUseUTS := s.UtsNS.NSMode == specgen.FromContainer || s.UtsNS.NSMode == specgen.FromPod || s.UtsNS.NSMode == specgen.Host
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// Add default sysctls
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defaultSysctls, err := util.ValidateSysctls(rtc.Sysctls())
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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for sysctlKey, sysctlVal := range defaultSysctls {
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// Ignore mqueue sysctls if --ipc=host
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if noUseIPC && strings.HasPrefix(sysctlKey, "fs.mqueue.") {
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logrus.Infof("Sysctl %s=%s ignored in containers.conf, since IPC Namespace set to %q", sysctlKey, sysctlVal, s.IpcNS.NSMode)
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continue
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}
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// Ignore net sysctls if --net=host
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if noUseNet && strings.HasPrefix(sysctlKey, "net.") {
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logrus.Infof("Sysctl %s=%s ignored in containers.conf, since Network Namespace set to host", sysctlKey, sysctlVal)
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continue
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}
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// Ignore uts sysctls if --uts=host
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if noUseUTS && (strings.HasPrefix(sysctlKey, "kernel.domainname") || strings.HasPrefix(sysctlKey, "kernel.hostname")) {
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logrus.Infof("Sysctl %s=%s ignored in containers.conf, since UTS Namespace set to host", sysctlKey, sysctlVal)
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continue
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}
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g.AddLinuxSysctl(sysctlKey, sysctlVal)
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}
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for sysctlKey, sysctlVal := range s.Sysctl {
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if s.IpcNS.IsHost() && strings.HasPrefix(sysctlKey, "fs.mqueue.") {
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return fmt.Errorf("sysctl %s=%s can't be set since IPC Namespace set to host: %w", sysctlKey, sysctlVal, define.ErrInvalidArg)
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}
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// Ignore net sysctls if --net=host
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if s.NetNS.IsHost() && strings.HasPrefix(sysctlKey, "net.") {
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return fmt.Errorf("sysctl %s=%s can't be set since Network Namespace set to host: %w", sysctlKey, sysctlVal, define.ErrInvalidArg)
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}
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// Ignore uts sysctls if --uts=host
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if s.UtsNS.IsHost() && (strings.HasPrefix(sysctlKey, "kernel.domainname") || strings.HasPrefix(sysctlKey, "kernel.hostname")) {
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return fmt.Errorf("sysctl %s=%s can't be set since UTS Namespace set to host: %w", sysctlKey, sysctlVal, define.ErrInvalidArg)
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}
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g.AddLinuxSysctl(sysctlKey, sysctlVal)
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}
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return nil
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}
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