odysseus/core/middleware.py
2026-07-27 20:30:32 +00:00

152 lines
6.5 KiB
Python

# src/middleware.py
# Shared middleware, decorators, and request helpers
import os
import secrets
from collections.abc import Mapping
from fastapi import HTTPException, Request
from starlette.middleware.base import BaseHTTPMiddleware
from starlette.responses import Response
from starlette.routing import get_route_path
# Per-process token that lets the in-app tool layer hit admin-gated
# routes via HTTP loopback (the agent's tool calls don't carry the
# admin user's session cookie). Set once at import; tools read the
# same value from this module. Never persisted or exposed externally.
INTERNAL_TOOL_TOKEN = os.environ.get("ODYSSEUS_INTERNAL_TOKEN") or secrets.token_hex(32)
INTERNAL_TOOL_HEADER = "X-Odysseus-Internal-Token"
# Pseudo-username on in-process tool-loopback requests; require_admin trusts it and it is reserved.
INTERNAL_TOOL_USER = "internal-tool"
def get_application_route_path(scope: Mapping[str, object]) -> str:
"""Return the application-relative path used by Starlette routing.
Uvicorn prefixes ``scope["path"]`` with a configured ASGI ``root_path``;
Starlette removes that prefix before matching routes. Middleware policy
must use the same path form or a deployment prefix can change which policy
applies to an otherwise unchanged application route.
"""
return get_route_path(scope)
def with_asgi_root_path(scope: Mapping[str, object], path: str) -> str:
"""Prefix an application path for a client-facing redirect target."""
root_path = scope.get("root_path", "")
if not isinstance(root_path, str) or not root_path:
return path
return f"{root_path.rstrip('/')}{path}"
def path_is_route_or_child(path: str, prefix: str) -> bool:
"""Return whether ``path`` is exactly ``prefix`` or below that route."""
return path == prefix or path.startswith(prefix + "/")
def is_cors_preflight(method: str, headers) -> bool:
"""True for a genuine CORS preflight: an OPTIONS request carrying the
Access-Control-Request-Method header. Such requests are credential-less by
design and must reach CORSMiddleware to be answered -- gating them on auth
401s the preflight and breaks every cross-origin browser/WebView client.
Pure so it can be unit-tested without standing up the app."""
return method == "OPTIONS" and "access-control-request-method" in headers
def require_admin(request: Request):
"""Raise 403 if the current user isn't an admin.
Allows access when auth is explicitly disabled, or when the request carries
the in-process internal-tool token used by loopback agent tools.
"""
# In-process bypass for tool-layer loopback calls. Two paths:
# (a) header-direct (caller set X-Odysseus-Internal-Token), or
# (b) the auth middleware already validated the token and stamped
# request.state.current_user = "internal-tool".
try:
hdr = request.headers.get(INTERNAL_TOOL_HEADER)
if hdr and secrets.compare_digest(hdr, INTERNAL_TOOL_TOKEN):
return
if getattr(request.state, "current_user", None) == INTERNAL_TOOL_USER:
return
except Exception:
pass
auth_mgr = getattr(request.app.state, "auth_manager", None)
if os.getenv("AUTH_ENABLED", "true").lower() == "false":
return
if not auth_mgr or not auth_mgr.is_configured:
raise HTTPException(403, "Admin only")
user = getattr(request.state, "current_user", None)
if not user or not auth_mgr.is_admin(user):
raise HTTPException(403, "Admin only")
class SecurityHeadersMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
"""Add standard security headers to all responses."""
async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next) -> Response:
# Generate a per-request nonce for inline scripts
nonce = secrets.token_hex(16)
request.state.csp_nonce = nonce
response = await call_next(request)
path = request.url.path
# Tool render endpoints
is_tool_render = path.startswith("/api/tools/") and path.endswith("/render")
# Document library PDF preview endpoint
is_document_pdf_preview = path.startswith("/api/document/") and path.endswith("/render-pdf")
# Visual report pages are self-contained HTML — need inline scripts + external images
is_report = path.startswith("/api/research/report/")
response.headers["X-Content-Type-Options"] = "nosniff"
response.headers["Referrer-Policy"] = "no-referrer"
response.headers["Permissions-Policy"] = "camera=(), microphone=(self), geolocation=()"
is_https = (
request.url.scheme == "https"
or request.headers.get("X-Forwarded-Proto") == "https"
)
if is_https:
response.headers["Strict-Transport-Security"] = "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains"
if is_report:
response.headers["Content-Security-Policy"] = (
"default-src 'self'; "
"script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; "
"style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; "
"font-src 'self'; "
"img-src 'self' data: blob: https:; "
"connect-src 'self'; "
"frame-ancestors 'none'"
)
elif is_tool_render:
# Skip framing headers for tools.
pass
elif is_document_pdf_preview:
response.headers["X-Frame-Options"] = "SAMEORIGIN"
response.headers["Content-Security-Policy"] = (
"default-src 'none'; "
"frame-ancestors 'self'"
)
else:
response.headers["X-Frame-Options"] = "DENY"
# NOTE: `style-src 'unsafe-inline'` is intentionally retained.
# `static/index.html` and `static/login.html` ship inline <style>
# blocks, and several JS modules build runtime `style=""` attrs.
# Migrating to nonce-only requires templating the HTML files +
# auditing every JS-set style attribute. Since inline styles
# don't execute script, the residual risk is visual-only.
response.headers["Content-Security-Policy"] = (
"default-src 'self'; "
f"script-src 'self' 'nonce-{nonce}' https://cdn.jsdelivr.net; "
"style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://cdn.jsdelivr.net; "
"font-src 'self' https://cdn.jsdelivr.net; "
"img-src 'self' data: blob: https:; "
"media-src 'self' blob:; "
"connect-src 'self'; "
"frame-src 'self'; "
"frame-ancestors 'none'"
)
return response