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f88e2d1f7f
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Merge commit from fork
* fix(security): stop API tokens reaching privileged agent tools A bearer API token resolves to the human who minted it, and minting is admin-only, so every owner-keyed privilege check in the agent path answers "admin". A token issued for a narrow integration therefore reached bash and python with the authority of the account that created it. Three independent routes to that sink, each closed here. The token could answer its own tool-approval prompt. An approval records that a person authorized one dangerous action, and a token cannot make that statement, so /api/chat_stream now refuses an approval resume from a bearer caller. The chat-session grant was reconstructable from caller-supplied message metadata. Two routes persist a metadata blob on the caller's behalf, so the shape of a resolved approval card could be written straight into a transcript and was then read back as authority. The server now signs the grant when it resolves an approval and verifies that signature when reading it back, binding it to the chat and the approval it was issued for. Both routes also drop server-owned keys from an inbound blob. A run driven by a token inherited its owner's tool set. Such a run is now capped at the non-admin policy regardless of who minted the credential, which holds even where no approval is raised at all. The human path is unchanged: a browser session still receives the prompt, still approves, and a granted chat-session scope still carries to later turns in that chat. Scope enforcement across the wider route surface is a separate gap and is not addressed here. * fix scoped chat delegation boundaries * fix(auth): reject malformed chat approval signatures --------- Co-authored-by: RaresKeY <158580472+RaresKeY@users.noreply.github.com> |
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981652358e
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fix(agent): allow remaining actions for an approved task (#6113)
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* fix(agent): allow remaining actions for an approved task * fix(agent): make approval continuation control-only * fix(ci): preserve approval taint and cache-buster contract * fix(ui): keep tool approvals in current chat * fix(ui): route tool approvals through chat submit * test(ui): pin approval submit routing * fix(agent): complete approval denial flow * fix(ui): avoid duplicate ask-user close icon * fix(agent): retain approved tool in continuation set * revert(ui): keep PR 6113 scoped to approval continuation * fix(agent): add task and chat approval scopes * fix(ui): prevent duplicate ask-user close icon * feat(ui): add ask-user option shortcuts * fix(compare): route ask-user choices per pane * fix(agent): keep skill-test approvals to a single action The chat card now reuses the wire value `approve` to mean chat-session scope, and `consume()` returned `allow_remaining_actions=True` for it unconditionally. The skill-test approval route was never updated: it still sends `approve` meaning "once", and its button still reads "Allow once", but the grant it got back set `approval_gate_bypassed` for the rest of the resumed run. That surface wraps the skill body and every transcript byte as untrusted context, so it is the last place where one click should ungate everything that follows. Give `consume()` an explicit `allow_continuation` flag. Callers that own a resumable chat keep the scope the user picked; callers that do not — the skill tester, unattended audits — get SINGLE_ACTION and the gate re-arms behind the sealed action, which is what their label promises. * fix(ui): cache-bust every module the approval click depends on chatStream.js, compare/index.js and compare/stream.js all changed behaviour but kept their old `?v=`, while chat.js and chatRenderer.js were bumped. A returning browser therefore serves the new chat.js — which now deliberately leaves the composer empty and clicks the send button — next to the cached chatStream.js that has no interceptor. With an empty composer that button sits at `data-mode="newchat"`, so the click opens a new chat and the approval is dropped. Bump the three, and version compare/stream.js's chatRenderer import to match everyone else's so the ask_user keydown listener binds to one module instance instead of two. * fix(ui): keep the digit shortcuts off tool approval cards With an approval card on screen and focus anywhere outside an input, a bare `1` fired `approve_task` — the widest of the three grants — with no modifier and no confirmation. That card is the one control whose entire purpose is deliberate consent after untrusted context influenced the run, and Deny sits at 3. Label the card with its kind and skip the shortcut for approvals. Ordinary ask_user questions keep 1-3. * fix(compare): restore a pane's ask_user card instead of dropping the choice renderAskUserCard removes the card as soon as onSubmit accepts, but the resume loop gave up silently after 10s if the originating stream still owned the pane. The user saw the click land, the card vanish, and nothing happen, with no way to get it back. Re-render the card on that deadline and say why. The reroll case still returns without sending — that choice belongs to a stream that no longer exists. * refactor(chat): drop the unreachable deny branch `if decision != "deny"` is always true — the deny path returns a StreamingResponse a few lines above. It reads as if deny still falls through to the toggle restore. --------- Co-authored-by: Léo <leograndcontact@gmail.com> |