From 5c2e3e7be0ea6eda01070d2dfc079e4e4bcea68f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: RaresKeY <158580472+RaresKeY@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Sat, 13 Jun 2026 20:34:27 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] feat(auth): define default local owner contract

---
 core/auth.py                                  | 25 +++-----
 core/middleware.py                            |  6 +-
 src/auth_helpers.py                           | 14 ++++-
 src/owner_identity.py                         | 56 +++++++++++++++++
 tests/test_owner_identity.py                  | 63 +++++++++++++++++++
 ...test_reserved_username_admin_escalation.py | 49 ++++++++++-----
 6 files changed, 177 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 src/owner_identity.py
 create mode 100644 tests/test_owner_identity.py

diff --git a/core/auth.py b/core/auth.py
index 4bc9a70dd..66fb6b753 100644
--- a/core/auth.py
+++ b/core/auth.py
@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
 
 from core.atomic_io import atomic_write_json as _atomic_write_json  # noqa: E402
-from core.middleware import INTERNAL_TOOL_USER  # noqa: E402
 
 DEFAULT_PRIVILEGES = {
     "can_use_agent": True,
@@ -49,24 +48,18 @@ ADMIN_PRIVILEGES["allowed_models_restricted"] = False
 ADMIN_PRIVILEGES["block_all_models"] = False
 
 from src.constants import AUTH_FILE, PASSWORD_MIN_LENGTH
+from src.owner_identity import RESERVED_AUTH_USERNAMES
 DEFAULT_AUTH_PATH = AUTH_FILE
 TOKEN_TTL = 60 * 60 * 24 * 7  # 7 days
 
-# Usernames the auth + middleware layer reserve as internal "synthetic owner"
-# sentinels; they must never belong to a real account. The most dangerous is
-# "internal-tool": `core.middleware.require_admin` treats any request whose
-# `current_user == "internal-tool"` as the in-process tool loopback and grants
-# admin, and because the cookie auth path sets `current_user` to the raw
-# username, an account literally named "internal-tool" would be silently
-# treated as an admin by every `require_admin`-gated route. "api" collides with
-# the bearer-token owner-attribution sentinel. "demo"/"system" round out the
-# synthetic-owner set the rest of the codebase already special-cases (see
-# `_SYNTHETIC_OWNERS` in routes/assistant_routes.py and the matching guards in
-# src/task_scheduler.py / routes/research_routes.py) — a real account with one
-# of those names would be denied an assistant and inconsistently owner-scoped.
-# Refuse to create or rename into any of them so the sentinels can't be
-# impersonated. (Keep this in sync with that synthetic-owner set.)
-RESERVED_USERNAMES = frozenset({INTERNAL_TOOL_USER, "api", "demo", "system"})
+# Usernames the auth + middleware layer reserves for request sentinels and
+# internal storage owners; they must never belong to a real login account.
+# "internal-tool" is the most dangerous because `core.middleware.require_admin`
+# treats it as the in-process tool loopback. "api" collides with bearer-token
+# attribution. "demo"/"system" are synthetic owners already special-cased by
+# scheduler/assistant/research paths. The Default/Local owner is a storage
+# bucket for explicit auth-disabled no-login mode, not a login username.
+RESERVED_USERNAMES = frozenset(RESERVED_AUTH_USERNAMES)
 
 
 def normalize_known_username(users: Dict[str, Any], username: str | None) -> Optional[str]:
diff --git a/core/middleware.py b/core/middleware.py
index 0e164e35a..51b1f97ca 100644
--- a/core/middleware.py
+++ b/core/middleware.py
@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ from fastapi import HTTPException, Request
 from starlette.middleware.base import BaseHTTPMiddleware
 from starlette.responses import Response
 
+from src.owner_identity import INTERNAL_TOOL_USER, auth_disabled
+
 
 # Per-process token that lets the in-app tool layer hit admin-gated
 # routes via HTTP loopback (the agent's tool calls don't carry the
@@ -15,8 +17,6 @@ from starlette.responses import Response
 # same value from this module. Never persisted or exposed externally.
 INTERNAL_TOOL_TOKEN = os.environ.get("ODYSSEUS_INTERNAL_TOKEN") or secrets.token_hex(32)
 INTERNAL_TOOL_HEADER = "X-Odysseus-Internal-Token"
-# Pseudo-username on in-process tool-loopback requests; require_admin trusts it and it is reserved.
-INTERNAL_TOOL_USER = "internal-tool"
 
 
 def is_cors_preflight(method: str, headers) -> bool:
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ def require_admin(request: Request):
         pass
 
     auth_mgr = getattr(request.app.state, "auth_manager", None)
-    if os.getenv("AUTH_ENABLED", "true").lower() == "false":
+    if auth_disabled():
         return
     if not auth_mgr or not auth_mgr.is_configured:
         raise HTTPException(403, "Admin only")
diff --git a/src/auth_helpers.py b/src/auth_helpers.py
index 49f3f01be..d290396c2 100644
--- a/src/auth_helpers.py
+++ b/src/auth_helpers.py
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ import os
 from typing import Optional
 from fastapi import Request, HTTPException
 
+from src.owner_identity import auth_disabled, effective_storage_owner
+
 
 def get_current_user(request: Request) -> Optional[str]:
     """Get current username from request state (set by auth middleware)."""
@@ -56,7 +58,17 @@ def _auth_disabled() -> bool:
     """True when the operator has explicitly turned off auth via .env.
     Mirrors the AUTH_ENABLED parse in app.py / core/middleware.py so the
     three call sites agree on what "off" means."""
-    return os.getenv("AUTH_ENABLED", "true").lower() == "false"
+    return auth_disabled()
+
+
+def storage_owner_for_request(request: Request) -> Optional[str]:
+    """Resolve the storage owner for code paths that need an owner bucket.
+
+    This does not replace route authentication. It only gives auth-disabled
+    no-login mode a stable storage identity instead of writing new data as
+    legacy NULL/ownerless state.
+    """
+    return effective_storage_owner(effective_user(request))
 
 
 def require_user(request: Request) -> str:
diff --git a/src/owner_identity.py b/src/owner_identity.py
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3eec83e42
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/owner_identity.py
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+"""Shared owner identity constants and helpers."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+from typing import Optional
+
+
+DEFAULT_LOCAL_OWNER = "__odysseus_local__"
+DEFAULT_LOCAL_OWNER_LABEL = "Local"
+INTERNAL_TOOL_USER = "internal-tool"
+
+REQUEST_SENTINEL_OWNERS = frozenset({INTERNAL_TOOL_USER, "api", "demo", "system"})
+RESERVED_AUTH_USERNAMES = REQUEST_SENTINEL_OWNERS | {DEFAULT_LOCAL_OWNER}
+
+
+def auth_disabled() -> bool:
+    """Return True only when auth is explicitly disabled by configuration."""
+    return os.getenv("AUTH_ENABLED", "true").strip().lower() == "false"
+
+
+def normalize_owner(owner: str | None) -> Optional[str]:
+    """Normalize an owner-like value without inventing a fallback identity."""
+    value = str(owner or "").strip()
+    return value or None
+
+
+def owner_key(owner: str | None) -> Optional[str]:
+    normalized = normalize_owner(owner)
+    return normalized.lower() if normalized else None
+
+
+def is_request_sentinel_owner(owner: str | None) -> bool:
+    return owner_key(owner) in REQUEST_SENTINEL_OWNERS
+
+
+def effective_storage_owner(owner: str | None, *, auth_is_disabled: bool | None = None) -> Optional[str]:
+    """Resolve the owner used for storage writes that need a real bucket.
+
+    ``None`` still means no authenticated owner when auth is enabled. In the
+    explicit no-login mode, it resolves to the reserved local owner instead of
+    conflating local-operator writes with legacy NULL/ownerless rows.
+    """
+    normalized = normalize_owner(owner)
+    if normalized:
+        if is_request_sentinel_owner(normalized):
+            return None
+        return normalized
+    disabled = auth_disabled() if auth_is_disabled is None else auth_is_disabled
+    if disabled:
+        return DEFAULT_LOCAL_OWNER
+    return None
+
+
+def is_default_local_owner(owner: str | None) -> bool:
+    return owner_key(owner) == DEFAULT_LOCAL_OWNER
diff --git a/tests/test_owner_identity.py b/tests/test_owner_identity.py
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1f3d159ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/test_owner_identity.py
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+
+import pytest
+
+
+def test_effective_storage_owner_matrix(monkeypatch):
+    from src.owner_identity import DEFAULT_LOCAL_OWNER, effective_storage_owner
+
+    monkeypatch.delenv("AUTH_ENABLED", raising=False)
+    assert effective_storage_owner(None) is None
+    assert effective_storage_owner("") is None
+    assert effective_storage_owner("alice") == "alice"
+    for sentinel in ("api", "demo", "system", "internal-tool"):
+        assert effective_storage_owner(sentinel) is None
+        assert effective_storage_owner(f" {sentinel.upper()} ") is None
+
+    monkeypatch.setenv("AUTH_ENABLED", "false")
+    assert effective_storage_owner(None) == DEFAULT_LOCAL_OWNER
+    assert effective_storage_owner("") == DEFAULT_LOCAL_OWNER
+    assert effective_storage_owner("admin") == "admin"
+    for sentinel in ("api", "demo", "system", "internal-tool"):
+        assert effective_storage_owner(sentinel) is None
+
+
+def test_storage_owner_for_request_uses_api_token_owner(monkeypatch):
+    from src.auth_helpers import storage_owner_for_request
+
+    monkeypatch.delenv("AUTH_ENABLED", raising=False)
+    request = SimpleNamespace(
+        state=SimpleNamespace(
+            current_user="api",
+            api_token=True,
+            api_token_owner="alice",
+        )
+    )
+
+    assert storage_owner_for_request(request) == "alice"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("sentinel", ["api", "demo", "system", "internal-tool"])
+def test_storage_owner_for_request_rejects_request_sentinel(monkeypatch, sentinel):
+    from src.auth_helpers import storage_owner_for_request
+
+    monkeypatch.delenv("AUTH_ENABLED", raising=False)
+    request = SimpleNamespace(
+        state=SimpleNamespace(
+            current_user=sentinel,
+            api_token=sentinel == "api",
+            api_token_owner=None,
+        )
+    )
+
+    assert storage_owner_for_request(request) is None
+
+
+def test_storage_owner_for_request_uses_default_local_when_auth_disabled(monkeypatch):
+    from src.auth_helpers import storage_owner_for_request
+    from src.owner_identity import DEFAULT_LOCAL_OWNER
+
+    monkeypatch.setenv("AUTH_ENABLED", "false")
+    request = SimpleNamespace(state=SimpleNamespace(current_user=None))
+
+    assert storage_owner_for_request(request) == DEFAULT_LOCAL_OWNER
diff --git a/tests/test_reserved_username_admin_escalation.py b/tests/test_reserved_username_admin_escalation.py
index eab5e4539..d70062581 100644
--- a/tests/test_reserved_username_admin_escalation.py
+++ b/tests/test_reserved_username_admin_escalation.py
@@ -16,8 +16,11 @@ from types import SimpleNamespace
 import pytest
 from fastapi import HTTPException
 
+from src.owner_identity import DEFAULT_LOCAL_OWNER
 from tests.helpers.import_state import clear_module
 
+_RESERVED_NAMES = ["internal-tool", "api", "demo", "system", DEFAULT_LOCAL_OWNER]
+
 
 def _fresh_auth_manager(tmp_path):
     # Same import dance as test_security_regressions: drop any cached stub so
@@ -30,7 +33,17 @@ def _fresh_auth_manager(tmp_path):
 
 @pytest.mark.parametrize(
     "name",
-    ["internal-tool", "api", "demo", "system", "INTERNAL-TOOL", " Internal-Tool ", "Api", "SYSTEM"],
+    [
+        "internal-tool",
+        "api",
+        "demo",
+        "system",
+        DEFAULT_LOCAL_OWNER,
+        "INTERNAL-TOOL",
+        " Internal-Tool ",
+        "Api",
+        "SYSTEM",
+    ],
 )
 def test_create_user_rejects_reserved_usernames(tmp_path, name):
     mgr = _fresh_auth_manager(tmp_path)
@@ -45,34 +58,37 @@ def test_create_user_rejects_empty_username(tmp_path):
     assert "" not in mgr.users
 
 
-def test_setup_rejects_reserved_admin_username(tmp_path):
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("name", _RESERVED_NAMES)
+def test_setup_rejects_reserved_admin_username(tmp_path, name):
     mgr = _fresh_auth_manager(tmp_path)
     # First-run admin setup funnels through create_user, so it's covered too.
-    assert mgr.setup("internal-tool", "pw-123456") is False
+    assert mgr.setup(name, "pw-123456") is False
     assert mgr.is_configured is False
 
 
-def test_rename_into_reserved_username_is_blocked(tmp_path):
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("name", _RESERVED_NAMES)
+def test_rename_into_reserved_username_is_blocked(tmp_path, name):
     mgr = _fresh_auth_manager(tmp_path)
     assert mgr.create_user("admin", "pw-123456", is_admin=True) is True
     assert mgr.create_user("bob", "pw-123456") is True
-    assert mgr.rename_user("bob", "internal-tool", "admin") is False
-    assert "internal-tool" not in mgr.users
+    assert mgr.rename_user("bob", name, "admin") is False
+    assert name not in mgr.users
     assert "bob" in mgr.users
 
 
-def test_legacy_reserved_username_is_removed_on_load(tmp_path):
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("name", _RESERVED_NAMES)
+def test_legacy_reserved_username_is_removed_on_load(tmp_path, name):
     auth_path = tmp_path / "auth.json"
     auth_path.write_text(
-        '{"users": {"internal-tool": {"password_hash": "unused", "is_admin": false}, '
-        '"admin": {"password_hash": "unused", "is_admin": true}}}',
+        '{"users": {"%s": {"password_hash": "unused", "is_admin": false}, '
+        '"admin": {"password_hash": "unused", "is_admin": true}}}' % name,
         encoding="utf-8",
     )
     mgr = _fresh_auth_manager(tmp_path)
 
-    assert "internal-tool" not in mgr.users
+    assert name not in mgr.users
     assert "admin" in mgr.users
-    assert "internal-tool" not in auth_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    assert name not in auth_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
 
 
 def test_legacy_reserved_username_session_cannot_authenticate(tmp_path):
@@ -121,15 +137,16 @@ def test_legacy_reserved_username_session_cannot_pass_admin_gate(tmp_path, monke
     assert exc.value.status_code == 403
 
 
-def test_legacy_reserved_single_user_migrates_to_admin(tmp_path):
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("name", _RESERVED_NAMES)
+def test_legacy_reserved_single_user_migrates_to_admin(tmp_path, name):
     auth_path = tmp_path / "auth.json"
     auth_path.write_text(
-        '{"username": "internal-tool", "password_hash": "unused"}',
+        '{"username": "%s", "password_hash": "unused"}' % name,
         encoding="utf-8",
     )
     mgr = _fresh_auth_manager(tmp_path)
 
-    assert "internal-tool" not in mgr.users
+    assert name not in mgr.users
     assert "admin" in mgr.users
     assert mgr.is_admin("admin") is True
 
@@ -141,8 +158,8 @@ def test_token_cache_owner_normalization_requires_current_user():
     users = {"alice": {}, "admin": {}}
 
     assert normalize_known_username(users, " Alice ") == "alice"
-    assert normalize_known_username(users, "internal-tool") is None
-    assert normalize_known_username(users, "api") is None
+    for name in _RESERVED_NAMES:
+        assert normalize_known_username(users, name) is None
     assert normalize_known_username(users, "") is None
 
 

From b2fc888e699bcd4a3466a0aac5f8a8696e817f16 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: RaresKeY <158580472+RaresKeY@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Sat, 13 Jun 2026 21:16:18 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] test(auth): harden default local owner matrix

---
 README.md                                     |  7 +++-
 THREAT_MODEL.md                               |  2 +-
 app.py                                        |  3 +-
 routes/assistant_routes.py                    |  7 ++--
 routes/research/research_routes.py            |  4 +-
 src/task_scheduler.py                         |  3 +-
 tests/test_owner_identity.py                  | 39 +++++++++++++++++++
 ...test_reserved_username_admin_escalation.py | 12 +-----
 tests/test_security_regressions.py            | 27 +++++++++++++
 9 files changed, 84 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 705ec6b68..4b96330b6 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -59,7 +59,12 @@ Help is welcome. The best entry points are fresh-install testing, provider setup
 
 ## Security
 
-Odysseus is a self-hosted workspace with powerful local tools. Keep auth enabled, keep private data out of Git, and do not expose raw model/service ports publicly. Deployment details are in the [setup guide](docs/setup.md#security-notes).
+Odysseus is a self-hosted workspace with powerful local tools. Keep auth enabled, keep private data out of Git, and do not expose raw model/service ports publicly.
+
+- Keep `AUTH_ENABLED=true` for any network-accessible deployment.
+- Keep `LOCALHOST_BYPASS=false` outside local development.
+
+Deployment details are in the [setup guide](docs/setup.md#security-notes).
 
 ## Star History
 
diff --git a/THREAT_MODEL.md b/THREAT_MODEL.md
index 48665a61d..ee656087c 100644
--- a/THREAT_MODEL.md
+++ b/THREAT_MODEL.md
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ Non-admin defaults are in `core/auth.py:DEFAULT_PRIVILEGES`. Tool enforcement is
 
 - **Sessions:** bcrypt passwords, 7-day session tokens stored atomically in `data/sessions.json` via `core/atomic_io.py`.
 - **2FA:** TOTP with 8 single-use backup codes. Verified after password check, before session issuance.
-- **Reserved usernames:** `internal-tool`, `api`, `demo`, `system` cannot be registered or renamed into. Defined in `core/auth.py:RESERVED_USERNAMES`.
+- **Reserved usernames:** request sentinels and the Default/Local storage owner cannot be registered or renamed into. Defined in `core/auth.py:RESERVED_USERNAMES`.
   - `internal-tool` is security-critical: `core/middleware.py:require_admin` treats any request where `request.state.current_user == "internal-tool"` as the in-process tool loopback and grants admin unconditionally. A real account with that name would silently pass every `require_admin` check.
 - **Orphan sessions:** `validate_token` re-checks that the user record still exists on every call. A deleted user's cookie is dropped on next request rather than continuing to authenticate.
 
diff --git a/app.py b/app.py
index e740ad518..5549a907b 100644
--- a/app.py
+++ b/app.py
@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ import bcrypt as _bcrypt
 
 from src.app_helpers import abs_join, serve_html_with_nonce
 from src.generated_images import GENERATED_IMAGE_HEADERS, resolve_generated_image_path
+from src.owner_identity import auth_disabled
 from starlette.responses import RedirectResponse
 
 # ========= LOGGING =========
@@ -248,7 +249,7 @@ from routes.auth_routes import setup_auth_routes, SESSION_COOKIE
 
 auth_manager = AuthManager()
 app.state.auth_manager = auth_manager
-AUTH_ENABLED = os.getenv("AUTH_ENABLED", "true").lower() != "false"
+AUTH_ENABLED = not auth_disabled()
 LOCALHOST_BYPASS = os.getenv("LOCALHOST_BYPASS", "false").lower() == "true"
 if LOCALHOST_BYPASS:
     logger.warning("LOCALHOST_BYPASS is enabled, loopback requests bypass authentication. Do not expose this instance to a network.")
diff --git a/routes/assistant_routes.py b/routes/assistant_routes.py
index 0b609e37f..f16f016e9 100644
--- a/routes/assistant_routes.py
+++ b/routes/assistant_routes.py
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ from pydantic import BaseModel
 
 from core.database import SessionLocal, CrewMember, ScheduledTask
 from src.auth_helpers import get_current_user
-from core.auth import RESERVED_USERNAMES
+from src.owner_identity import REQUEST_SENTINEL_OWNERS
 from src.task_scheduler import compute_next_run
 
 
@@ -90,11 +90,12 @@ def setup_assistant_routes(task_scheduler) -> APIRouter:
     # check-in tasks seeded. Hitting any /assistant route under one of these
     # used to seed a full CrewMember + Morning/Midday/Evening tasks under that
     # owner, which then double-fired alongside the real user's check-ins.
-    # RESERVED_USERNAMES covers the same set; the `not owner` guard handles "".
+    # REQUEST_SENTINEL_OWNERS covers request-only identities; Default/Local is a
+    # reserved login name but remains a valid storage owner.
 
     async def _get_or_create(owner: str) -> CrewMember:
         """Return the per-owner assistant CrewMember, creating it on demand."""
-        if not owner or owner in RESERVED_USERNAMES:
+        if not owner or owner in REQUEST_SENTINEL_OWNERS:
             raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"Cannot seed assistant for {owner!r}")
         db = SessionLocal()
         try:
diff --git a/routes/research/research_routes.py b/routes/research/research_routes.py
index fdc650d95..905ee4b92 100644
--- a/routes/research/research_routes.py
+++ b/routes/research/research_routes.py
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
 from core.middleware import INTERNAL_TOOL_USER
 from src.endpoint_resolver import resolve_endpoint
 from src.auth_helpers import _auth_disabled, get_current_user
-from core.auth import RESERVED_USERNAMES
+from src.owner_identity import REQUEST_SENTINEL_OWNERS
 from src.constants import DEEP_RESEARCH_DIR
 
 _SESSION_ID_RE = re.compile(r"^[a-zA-Z0-9-]{1,128}$")
@@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ def setup_research_routes(research_handler, session_manager=None) -> APIRouter:
         user = require_privilege(request, "can_use_research")
         if user == INTERNAL_TOOL_USER:
             tool_owner = (request.headers.get("X-Odysseus-Owner") or "").strip()
-            if tool_owner and tool_owner not in RESERVED_USERNAMES:
+            if tool_owner and tool_owner not in REQUEST_SENTINEL_OWNERS:
                 auth_mgr = getattr(request.app.state, "auth_manager", None)
                 if auth_mgr is not None and getattr(auth_mgr, "is_configured", False):
                     try:
diff --git a/src/task_scheduler.py b/src/task_scheduler.py
index d5b1dad62..30f5619ba 100644
--- a/src/task_scheduler.py
+++ b/src/task_scheduler.py
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
 from typing import Any, Awaitable, Callable, Dict, Tuple
 
 from core.auth import RESERVED_USERNAMES
+from src.owner_identity import REQUEST_SENTINEL_OWNERS
 from src.task_action_policy import (
     is_admin_only_task_action,
     owner_has_admin_task_privileges,
@@ -2484,7 +2485,7 @@ class TaskScheduler:
         # check-ins seeded, which then double-fire alongside the human user's
         # check-ins. This was the root cause of the duplicate 'Morning check-in'
         # rows we had to manually clean up.
-        if not owner or owner in RESERVED_USERNAMES:
+        if not owner or owner in REQUEST_SENTINEL_OWNERS:
             logger.info(f"ensure_assistant_defaults: skip synthetic owner {owner!r}")
             return
         from core.database import SessionLocal, CrewMember, ScheduledTask
diff --git a/tests/test_owner_identity.py b/tests/test_owner_identity.py
index 1f3d159ef..8362f79eb 100644
--- a/tests/test_owner_identity.py
+++ b/tests/test_owner_identity.py
@@ -61,3 +61,42 @@ def test_storage_owner_for_request_uses_default_local_when_auth_disabled(monkeyp
     request = SimpleNamespace(state=SimpleNamespace(current_user=None))
 
     assert storage_owner_for_request(request) == DEFAULT_LOCAL_OWNER
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "value,expected",
+    [
+        (None, False),
+        ("", False),
+        ("true", False),
+        ("0", False),
+        ("false", True),
+        ("FALSE", True),
+        (" false ", True),
+    ],
+)
+def test_auth_disabled_parser_is_centralized(monkeypatch, value, expected):
+    from src.owner_identity import auth_disabled
+
+    if value is None:
+        monkeypatch.delenv("AUTH_ENABLED", raising=False)
+    else:
+        monkeypatch.setenv("AUTH_ENABLED", value)
+
+    assert auth_disabled() is expected
+
+
+def test_default_local_owner_is_reserved_auth_name_but_valid_storage_owner():
+    from src.owner_identity import (
+        DEFAULT_LOCAL_OWNER,
+        REQUEST_SENTINEL_OWNERS,
+        RESERVED_AUTH_USERNAMES,
+        effective_storage_owner,
+        is_default_local_owner,
+    )
+
+    assert DEFAULT_LOCAL_OWNER in RESERVED_AUTH_USERNAMES
+    assert DEFAULT_LOCAL_OWNER not in REQUEST_SENTINEL_OWNERS
+    assert effective_storage_owner(DEFAULT_LOCAL_OWNER, auth_is_disabled=False) == DEFAULT_LOCAL_OWNER
+    assert effective_storage_owner(DEFAULT_LOCAL_OWNER, auth_is_disabled=True) == DEFAULT_LOCAL_OWNER
+    assert is_default_local_owner(f" {DEFAULT_LOCAL_OWNER.upper()} ")
diff --git a/tests/test_reserved_username_admin_escalation.py b/tests/test_reserved_username_admin_escalation.py
index d70062581..f411ce658 100644
--- a/tests/test_reserved_username_admin_escalation.py
+++ b/tests/test_reserved_username_admin_escalation.py
@@ -33,17 +33,7 @@ def _fresh_auth_manager(tmp_path):
 
 @pytest.mark.parametrize(
     "name",
-    [
-        "internal-tool",
-        "api",
-        "demo",
-        "system",
-        DEFAULT_LOCAL_OWNER,
-        "INTERNAL-TOOL",
-        " Internal-Tool ",
-        "Api",
-        "SYSTEM",
-    ],
+    _RESERVED_NAMES + ["INTERNAL-TOOL", " Internal-Tool ", "Api", "SYSTEM"],
 )
 def test_create_user_rejects_reserved_usernames(tmp_path, name):
     mgr = _fresh_auth_manager(tmp_path)
diff --git a/tests/test_security_regressions.py b/tests/test_security_regressions.py
index f6a05383d..8e3f57266 100644
--- a/tests/test_security_regressions.py
+++ b/tests/test_security_regressions.py
@@ -131,6 +131,12 @@ def test_readme_native_quickstart_uses_loopback():
     assert "0.0.0.0` only when you intentionally want" in docs
 
 
+def test_readme_warns_auth_enabled_for_network_access():
+    readme = Path("README.md").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    assert "Keep `AUTH_ENABLED=true` for any network-accessible deployment." in readme
+    assert "Keep `LOCALHOST_BYPASS=false` outside local development." in readme
+
+
 def test_ollama_cookbook_runner_does_not_force_public_bind():
     route = Path("routes/cookbook_routes.py").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
     cookbook_js = Path("static/js/cookbook.js").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
@@ -738,6 +744,27 @@ def test_require_admin_allows_when_auth_explicitly_disabled(monkeypatch):
     assert require_admin(_Req()) is None
 
 
+def test_require_admin_uses_central_auth_disabled_parser(monkeypatch):
+    from core.middleware import require_admin
+
+    monkeypatch.setenv("AUTH_ENABLED", " false ")
+
+    class _State:
+        current_user = None
+
+    class _AppState:
+        auth_manager = None
+
+    class _App:
+        state = _AppState()
+
+    class _Req:
+        state = _State()
+        app = _App()
+
+    assert require_admin(_Req()) is None
+
+
 def test_internal_tool_owner_header_logic_requires_known_user():
     """Pin the owner-attribution branch used by app.AuthMiddleware without
     booting the full FastAPI app."""